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since he does the same work as those whom he employs.12 In fact an
organization of men whose labor is personal service sold directly to the
public, rather than directly to the employer who in turn sells the pro-
duct of their labor to the public as in a manufacturing plant, is more
like as association of semi-professional men than a labor union.13 This
common interest between employer and employee becomes of less and
less importance as the number of employees is increased and the at-
tention of the owner of the shop is increasingly directed more to the
running of the shop than to the rendition of personal service by him-
self. Yet the test of the Wisconsin Supreme Court here as to the per
cent of union support attributable directly to the employer also grows
less and less pertinent as the number of employees is increased. And
so it would appear that as their interests become more dissimilar, and
hence the need for the protection of the Wisconsin Employment Peace
Act greater, there is increasingly less reason to invoke the prohibition
of Section 111.06 (1) (b). This case discloses the need for legislation
more pertinent to the specialized relation of the independent and semi-
independent craftsmen, comprising so large a part of our laboring class.
They have been neglected in the present statute, fashioned primarily
to meet the needs of others.
WILLIAM S. PFANKUCH
Corporations - Non-Delegable Powers of Board of Directors - The
directors of two corporations considered it in the best interests of both
for defendant Carlisle to obtain 80% or more of Dart's outstanding
stock by an exchange of defendant's stock for Dart's stock. They
caused the two corporations to enter into an agreement whereby de-
fendant promised to make available shares of its stock in exchange for
shares of Dart's "on the basis of such number of shares of Carlisle
for each 1 share of Dart as may be determined to be fair and equitable
by an independent appraiser to be designated by Carlisle, provided,
however, that such exchange shall not exceed a maximum of 218 shares
of Carlisle for each 1 share of Dart." The rest of the agreement bound
defendant irrevocably to issue, but neither Dart or its stockholders
bound themselves to accept, up to 174,400 shares of defendant's stock.
12 The similarity of those interests was used by the appellant union as one of
the reasons why the employer should be amenable to the coercion of the union
by means of peaceful picketing, so as to require him to share in the expense
of furthering those common interests; ". . . the working employer enjoys
many benefits as a journeyman which were obtained only by unceasing and
costly struggles of the . . . union. The prices he can get for his services, the
regulated training under apprenticeship laws, the beneficent legislation regu-
lating the trade and entrance to the trade.. ."; p. 80 of the principal case.
13 As pointed out above the courts of at least two states have come to the same
conclusion; supra note 5.
[Vol. 3
RECENT DECISIONS
The minutes of the meeting at which the agreement was authorized
by the defendant's board, show that the maximum figure of 218 shares
was Dart's offer, while defendant's offer was 175. Before the appraiser
reached a conclusion, plaintiff, a stockholder of defendant, sued to
enjoin the proposed agreement on the ground that it constituted an
unlawful delegation of power by the board of directors. At the time
complaint was filed, a restraining order was issued. At the same time
the court issued a rule to show cause why a preliminary injunction in
the same tenor should not issue. Held: Injunction granted. Under
the Delaware statutes' the directors may not delegate the duty to de-
termine the value of property acquired as consideration for the issu-
ance of stock. Neither the statutes nor the certificate of incorporation 2
contained any language purporting to authorize such delegation and
the importance to the corporation of the subject matter-ownership
of the corporation-tends to negative any implication that it might be
delegated in a manner not explicitly authorized by statute. The court
dismissed defendant's contention that the directors did perform their
determinative duty by setting an upper limit, pointing out that the
maximum figure was merely Dart's offer. Field v. Carlisle Corporation,
68 A. 2d 817 (Del. 1949).
In testing the question of delegability of authority by the board of
directors, the early cases ran into some difficulty as to the exact nature
of that body.3 That they acted as agents of the stockholders and thus
were bound by the maxim delegatus non potest delegare was early re-
jected, because the stockholders neither confer nor can they revoke the
board's powers. Rather the powers were considered original, and
"derivative only in the sense of being received from the State in the
act of incorporation."'4 On the other hand to make the board principals
with unbridled power of delegation seems inconsistent with the idea
it has no common law but only granted powers.5 Perhaps a satisfactory
'Revised Code of Delaware (1935) §2041 Sec. 9. "The business of every corp-
oration .. .shall be managed by a Board of Directors.. . ."; §2046 Sec. 14
"... Subscriptions to, or the purchase price of, the capital stock of any corp-
oration . . .may be paid for ... by labor done, by personal property, or by
real property or leases thereof; .... And in the absence of actual fraud in
the transaction, the judgment of the directors, as to the value of such. .. shall
be conclusive . . . shares of capital stock without par value, whether common
or preferred or special, may be issued by the corporation from time to time
for such consideration as may be fixed from time to time by the Board of
Directors thereof ......
2 "The common stock may be issued from time to time for such consideration
as may be fixed from time to time by the board of directors of the corpora-
tion, and any and all such shares so issued, the full consideration for which
has been paid or delivered, shall be deemed full paid stock and not liable to
any further call or assessment thereon, and the holder of such shares shall
not be liable for any further payments."
3 20 Harvard Law Review 225 (1907).
4 Hoyt v. Thompson's Executor, 19 N.Y. 207 (1859).
5 Town of Royalton v. Royalton & Woodstock Turnpike Co., 14 Vt. 311 (1843).
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conclusion is that the board exercises its powers in a fiduciary capacity,
for the benefit of stockholders 6 and by analogy, the general rule against
a trustee delegating his authority7 may be applied."
Whatever the nature of the body, it is clear that authority exists to
delegate the conduct of ordinary, routine, ministerial business matters.9
Beyond this there is some confusion, probably due to the vagueness
of the terms "ministerial" and "discretionary", and their application
in a business world. Incorporation statutes generally provide that the
business of the corporation shall be managed by a board of directors, 10
and some add a power in the board to appoint such subordinates as the
business may require.': Though the latter type gives express authority
to delegate, the decisions under either are the same.12 But the power
to delegate even in a business or managerial sense is not unlimited; the
board will be required to leave undelegated, matters which are on a
"policy" level.' 8
Some cases are cited by textwriters as denying the delegability of
any discretionary powers by the board,' 4 and a Wisconsin case 5 is
6 Cook v. The Berlin Woolen Mill Co., 43 Wis. 433 (1877) at 439; "A distinction
is recognized ... between corporate officers, whose offices are of the essence
of the corporation, and whose offices are merely ministerial . . . Courts of
equity deal with the former as trustees; with the latter as agents."
73 BOGART, The Law of Trusts and Trustees §555 (1935).
8 Gulf & S.I.R. Co. v. Laurel Oil & Fertilizer Co., 171 Miss. 741, 158 So. 778
(1935).9 First Nat'l. Bank of Binghampton v. Commercial Traveller's Home Ass'n. of
America, 95 N.Y.S. 454, Aff'd. 185 N.Y 575 78 N.E. 1103 (1906).
10 See Del. statute, supra, n. 1 ; Wis. Stat. 180.f3 (1) (1947).
"11 Cahill, NEW YORK CONSOLIDATED LAWS, DECENNIAL SUPPLE-
MENT (1948). General Corporation Law, §14, "Every corporation as such has
power, though not specified in the law under which it is incorporated: (4) To
appoint such officers and agents as its business shall require ....
12 Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 39 S.W. 486, 490 (1897) ; "At common law the
power to have a board of directors was inherent in the corporation. The
statute of Missouri requiring the business and property of a corporation to be
managed and controlled by directors is but an affirmance of the common law
power. So, likewise, the directors have power, without statutory authority, to
delegate . . . not only ordinary and routine business, but business requiring
the highest degree of judgment and discretion ... The power expressly given
by statute to the board of directors 'to appoint such subordinate officers and
agents as the business of the corporation may require' does not limit or di-
minish the common law power to delegate authority."
13 Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mutual Casualty Co., 41 F. 2d 588 (CCA-7
1930). The court distinguishes Jones v. Williams, supra, n. 12, wherein dele-
gation of the editorial policy of a newspaper for five years was upheld, stating
that that case illustrated the extent to which courts have gone, but declared
void the contract in question which gave defendants "the underwriting and
executive management" for 20 years; Manson v. Curtis 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E.
559 (1918).
'1 Ames v. Goldfield M.M. Co., 227 F. 292 (1915).
'5 Perfex Radiator Co. v. Goetz, 179 Wis. 338, 191 N.W. 755, 759 (1923). Though
the court decided the case on other grounds, it said, "That it is ordinarily
illegal for a board of directors to delegate the powers vested in them either
by statute or the articles of organization is too plain for argument, and such
delegation ordinarily is as illegal as is the delegation of power of a legislative
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among them. The language of the Wisconsin case caused some com-
ment calling for a statute authorizing executive committees in this
State,16 which statute was passed in 1943.' That there are restrictions
on executive committees, created by statutes less explicit than that of
Wisconsin, or by charter, or by-laws, is also apparent.'"
There are, however, certain non-delegable powers, and these exist
when discretionary power is vested exclusively in the board by statute,
charter, vote of stockholders, or usage.19 Thus an executive commit-
tee acting under a by-law granting it "full powers" of the board was
held not to have the board's granting powers to amend the by-laws,
change members of the committee, or remove officers ,2 and stock was
held illegally issued where issued without the authority of the directors,
but with authority of an executive committee which had not been given
such express power. 1
It is clear that the contract in the principal case clearly falls into
the latter category, and that the duty of fixing the consideration for the
defendant's stock could not be delegated under the statute. However,
the interesting point in the case is the defendant's contention that the
board had performed its determinative duty by setting a maximum limit
beyond which the delegatee could not go. Admittedly, under the facts
of the case, the directors had not exercised independent judgment in
setting the maximum figure. But if they had conscientously determined
a reasonable range or norm, and since an analogy has been drawn to
the delegation of legislative powers,2 would not such deliberation sat-
isfy the rule in the latter field ;23 and therefore, by analogy, satisfy the
body unless expressly authorized by law." The court then cited the Ames case,
supra n. 14, with approval.16 See 11 Wisconsin Law Review 457 (1936); 1939 Wis. Law Review 173.
'1 Wis. Stat. 180.13 (2) (1947). "If authorized by the by-laws of the corporation,
the board of directors may elect an executive committee to consist of not less
than 3 directors, which committee may to the extent provided in the by-laws
have and exercise the powers of the board of directors when not in session,
except action in respect of dividends to stockholders, election of officers, or the
filling of vacancies in the board of directors or executive committee."
18 See extensive note, 42 Mich. Law Review 133 (1943).
19 2 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §497 (perm. ed. 1931); Jones
v. Williams, supra, n. 12, recognized the distinction between acts involving
"corporate rights and powers" and acts "pertaining to business".
20 Hayes v. Canada. Atlantic & Plant S.S. Co. Ltd., 181 F. 289 (CCA-1 1910).
21 Ryder v. Bushwick R. Co., 134 N.Y. 83, 31 N.E. 251 (1892).
22 Perfex Radiator Co. v. Goetz, supra, n. 15.
23 State ex rel. Wis. Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472 at 505, 220 N.W.
929, 941 (1928) ; "The power to declare whether or not there shall be a law;
to determine the general purpose or policy to be achieved by the law; to fix
the limits within which the law shall operate,--is a power which is vested by
our constitutions in the legislature and may not be delegated. When, however,
the legislature has laid down these fundamental of a law, it may delegate
... the authority to exercise such legislative power as is necessary to carry
into effect the general legislative purpose, in the language of Chief Justice
MARSHALL 'to fill up the details': .... It only leads to confusion and error
19501
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rule in the corporate field? If so, need for ratification would be dis-
pensed with; third parties could safely deal with delegates in the first
instance; and delay, the thorn in the side of modern business, could
be minimized.
RALPH H. DELFORGE
Constitutional Law -Protection Against Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures-The defendant was suspected of unlawfully receiving and
concealing narcotics. He was apprehended by local and federal officers
who did not have a warrant for his arrest or a search warrant. At the
time of the arrest the defendant swallowed two capsules of heroin in
order that the heroin would not be found in his possession. He was
then forced to submit to a "stomach pump treatment" so that the
officers could obtain the heroin from his stomach. A federal officer took
part in the entire proceeding. The defendant was then indicted for
knowingly and unlawfully receiving and concealing two grains of
heroin. Held: Forcing a person to submit to a stomach pump treatment
is an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.1
Any evidence obtained by such a search is inadmissible. United States
v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S. D. California 1949).
The question raised by this decision is: to what extent will the
courts protect an individual against compulsion of physical evidence
both of and from the body? The answer to this question will depend
upon what right an individual has to such protection. The principal
case bases this right on a liberal interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Since the Fourth Amendment is a prohibition against only those
searches and seizures that are unreasonable, the protection of the indi-
vidual hinges upon what is meant by "unreasonable". The courts say
that the question of unreasonableness is relative and each case is to be
decided on its own facts and circumstances.2 The search may be un-
reasonable if it is out of proportion to the end sought. 3 The term un-
reasonable cannot, therefore, be precisely defined. However, the general
trend in the United States Supreme Court is to extend or broaden the
power of federal authorities to search for and seize goods without a
search warrant or, stating this trend in other words, the Supreme Court
to say that the power to fill up the details ... is not legislative power." (italics
ours).
1 U.S. Const. Amend. IV provides: "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or, affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
2 United States v. Costner, 153 F. (2d) 23, 26 (C.C.A. 6th 1946).
3 Zimmermann v. Wilson, 105 F. (2d) 583, 585 (C.C.A. 3rd 1939).
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